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than health records are exchanged today. The protection of a patients' health information is an important factor in the adoption of the EHR.
Integrating security across different business and technical layers is necessary in order to address complex data protection challenges in today's HIEs. This publication presents a five-layered architecture design process as a systematic approach to identify and implement HIE security and privacy. The five-layers, which are required elements for ensuring data protection, include: 1) policies; 2) core services; 3) business processes; 4) notional architecture; and 5) technical solutions. The security architecture design process provides a scalable and standardized methodology to guide HIE system development in the integration of data protection mechanisms across each layer, and results in a technology selection and design that satisfies high level requirements and mitigates identified risks to organizational risk tolerances.
Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this publication is to provide a systematic approach to designing a technical security architecture for the exchange of health information by leveraging common government and commercial practices and applying them specifically to the HIE domain. The publication defines the five-layers of this design process, their purposes and their relationships, and how they work together systematically to facilitate the secure exchange of protected health information.
This publication focuses specifically on the health information exchange process; it does not discuss the development of the entire information technology architecture of an HIE. Many organizations must comply with data protection laws at the local, state, federal, or international levels that will require them to conduct certain activities under specific operational parameters. While this publication does not directly address nontechnical issues such as those related to laws, regulations, and policies, specific roles and responsibilities, training, human resources issues, or nontechnical privacy issues, it does describe an architecture design process that allows for their integration into the information technology architecture of an HIE.
While the main focus of this document is security architecture, it is understood that privacy protections are essential to the collection, access, use, and disclosure of protected health information. For the purposes of this document, technical assurance of privacy is viewed as a subset of confidentiality. Implementation of security technologies that support confidentiality objectives may in turn support the technical implementation of privacy policy.
Audience
HIE executives, HIE security policy developers, HIE security architects, and technical solution providers are the principal audience for this publication. The objective is to provide a development approach through various stages of an HIE lifecycle to produce a security architecture for the identification of appropriate technologies or to serve as an evaluation model for existing HIEs.
Document Organization
The remaining sections of this document discuss the following:
• Section 3.0, HIE Contexts, describes the scope and characteristics of the four main HIE contexts discussed in this document.
• Section 4.0, HIT Security Architecture Design Process Overview, introduces the five-layer operating model to address those barriers.
• Section 5.0, Capstone Policies -Layer 1, identifies and describes many major U.S. laws, regulations, and guidelines that influence and, in many cases, drive the development of an organization's policies for ensuring secure exchange of health information.
• Section 6.0, Enabling Services -Layer 2, identifies and discusses 12 services, derived from common industry-wide practices, necessary to implement the Capstone Policies.
• Section 7.0, Enabling Processes -Layer 3, describes processes that expand the Enabling Services into detailed, HIE-specific business requirements.
• Section 8.0, Notional Architecture -Layer 4, identifies architecture design principles and constructs that will serve as inputs, along with Capstone Policies and Enabling Services and Processes, to create a Notional Architecture, the blueprint to drive technical solution decisions.
• Section 9.0, Technology Solutions and Standards -Layer 5, illustrates the steps to select the technical solutions and data standards that will satisfy the requirements specified in the Notional Architecture.
• Section 10.0, Building a Nationwide HIE using Regional HIEs, discusses using a federation of Regional HIEs to construct a Nationwide HIE with federated security services.
• Appendix A, Applying the Security Architecture Design Process, employs the five-layer design process to a specific American Health Information Community (AHIC) Use Case to illustrate the analyses and considerations that need to be made when applying this model to the exchange of health information.
HIE Contexts
There are many contexts in which health information can be exchanged. Therefore, it is important to identify under which contexts the security architecture design process presented in this publication is most applicable. Four main HIE contexts are identified in the following figure: ad hoc, regional, multi-regional and national.
Figure 1. HIE Contexts

Ad Hoc HIEs
An ad hoc HIE occurs when two healthcare organizations exchange paper-based health information, usually under the precondition of familiarity and trust, using traditional mechanisms such as faxing and phone calls. Health organizations that currently practice paper-based ad hoc HIEs may find it impractical to justify the cost to migrate into electronic health record (EHR)-based HIEs unless there is a regional force behind it.
Regional HIEs
Regional HIEs are those that consist of two or more legally and commercially independent institutions that share EHRs, but where no state jurisdictional issues exist that prevent or impede the sharing of data. 3 The HIE network includes clinicians, hospitals, labs, pharmacies, insurance companies, and other key health domain players. Participating organizations will normally draft a trust agreement to govern the information exchange. Depending on the scale, the technical architecture might be centralized or federated. Regional HIEs do not have state jurisdictional conflicts and are large enough to justify self-sustained EHR-based HIEs. They are considered simpler than multi-regional and national HIEs because of their smaller scale and lack of state jurisdictional conflicts.
Multi-Regional HIEs
Multi-regional HIEs connect multiple regional HIEs. They may cross state lines or other physical boundaries. They are usually EHR-based. Since they connect multiple regional HIEs, they will have a federated technical architecture. For multi-regional HIEs, conflicts of laws may require complex solutions.
National HIEs
The national HIE connects many multi-regional HIEs. Hence it is based on EHRs, involves multiple state jurisdictions, and has a national federated technical architecture. Multi-regional and national HIEs have a different focus than regional HIEs. Regional HIEs are basic building blocks that focus on developing effective and localized solutions to meet specific HIE needs (research, clinical trials, patient transfer, etc). Multi-regional and national HIEs focus on building the backbone infrastructure needed to connect various regional HIEs.
This publication focuses on the needs of regional HIEs. Assuming that the security architectures and other system aspects of regional HIEs are interoperable, these HIEs can serve as the "building blocks" for larger multi-regional and national HIEs, and therefore represent a scalable solution for the ultimate emergence of a national HIE.
HIE Security Architecture Design Process
Technical solutions that facilitate the exchange of health information can be complex. With various policies and standards, and an ever-changing technical landscape, a systematic approach to designing an HIE security architecture can allow practitioners to analyze all policy requirements and ultimately refine them into a technology-neutral, vendor-neutral, standardsbased architecture to drive technical solution decisions.
The use of a systematic approach plays a significant role in a successful and secure HIE implementation. The HIE security architecture design process was developed to assist HIEs in meeting this need by providing a five-layered methodology for successful HIE security technology identification and selection as illustrated in the following figure:
Figure 2. HIE Security Architecture Design Process 1) Capstone Policies: Capstone policies provide overall requirements and guidance for protecting health information within HIEs. They can be driven by national laws, regulations, and guidelines, state regulations, organizational policies, business needs, or policies developed for specific HIEs.
2) Enabling Services: Enabling services define the nomenclature of services required to implement capstone policies. Enabling services are designed to be HIE context-independent. Services presented in this publication are derived from common industry-wide data protection practices and then customized to specifically address the requirements of HIEs.
3) Enabling Processes: Enabling processes define the operational baseline via use cases and scenarios for enabling services. Enabling processes are HIE context-dependent. Two HIEs could, for example, have different enabling processes implementing the "Access Control" service.
4) Notional Architectures:
Notional architectures define the technical constructs (e.g., rolebased access control and directory services) and their relationships to implement enabling processes. Notional architecture is the blueprint to drive the selection of technical solutions and data standards. Notional architecture is standards-based, technology-neutral, and vendorneutral.
5) Technology Solutions and Standards:
Technical solutions and data standards represent the selected the technical solutions and the data standards needed to implement the notional architecture.
Each layer of the design methodology is described in the following sections.
Capstone Policies -Layer 1
Capstone policies are those policies that are developed by institutions participating in HIEs and that provide overall requirements and guidance for protecting health information within those HIEs. Ideally, capstone policies should address the requirements imposed by all laws, regulations, and guidelines at the national, state, and local levels; business needs; and policies at the institutional and HIE levels.
In developing capstone policies, organizations must identify the requirements that these laws, regulations, and other authorities impose on HIEs. One challenge in ascertaining that all such requirements have been identified is that these sources of requirements may not be specific to health information systems. For federally owned or operated systems, for example, other requirements such as the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA 4 ) will also need to be considered. For this reason, organizations must consider the expert input of appropriate legal counsel in assembling these requirements.
Within this section, many major U.S. federal laws relevant to the development of HIE security and privacy architectures are identified. For virtually all U.S. entities, however, other federal and state laws will also need to be considered. These representative laws are identified as illustrative and as assistance to organizations. In particular, state laws may be significant. Under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), more stringent state laws that may require additional or greater protections for PHI must be followed. The existence of HIPAA does not negate such requirements, or excuse the covered entity from addressing them.
In many cases, relevant laws, regulations, and policies will impose other requirements aside from those that help identify capstone policies. These authorities may also establish broad goals or end states, without specifically defining enabling services, and may need to be interpreted based on industry best practices or reasonable safeguards. Addressing the text alone, therefore, may not be sufficient in order to ensure secure HIEs. In cases where authorities urge the institution of appropriate policies without proposing specific safeguards, practitioners should not confine themselves to developing capstone policies that merely satisfy compliance, but should view these authorities as setting only a minimum set of requirements.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA, is the most well-known and influential law affecting the security and privacy practices of many healthcare organizations in the United States (those that are "covered entities" under the Act). HIPAA required the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to create sets of regulations on several topics related to electronic healthcare transactions, including the privacy of protected health information (PHI) and the security of electronic protected health information (ePHI 
Other Key Drivers for Capstone Policies
Other laws and regulations may also drive requirements for the functionality of security controls, depending on an HIE or its components' functions, activities, business partners, the types of information it handles, status as a government agency or private commercial entity, or its geography. This publication identifies many of the most common federal laws and regulations that create requirements for capstone policies for large numbers of organizations across the United States. However, all related federal laws and regulations, and relevant state and local policies may not be identified. Table 1 lists a selection of the laws and regulations that may affect the healthcare transactions for some entities. In addition to these, there are numerous state and local laws and regulations that may impact technology selection and implementation. 
Enabling Services -Layer 2
Enabling services are those services that are necessary to implement capstone policies. These services are typically HIE "context-independent," meaning they will be included in all HIEs although the manner of implementation may be different for different systems. For example, two HIEs both providing "Access Control" services might have different implementation models for them.
The function of enabling services is to provide a standard set of minimum requirements across HIEs, but not to establish definitive methods for obtaining them. This means that every HIE will need to deploy enabling services using appropriate solutions that must be identified and selected.
Having a consistent, standards-based set of enabling services can benefit future interoperability between HIEs. This standardization provides a basic assurance level on the implementation of security and privacy controls, and it will be easier to determine and address discrepancies among HIEs.
Services presented in this publication are derived from the Healthcare Information Technology Standards Panel (HITSP)(www.hitsp.org) Security, Privacy, and Infrastructure constructs, which detail the selection of standards to meet Use Case requirements defined by the American Health Information Community (AHIC), and common established security principles. These are then distilled to specifically address the data protection requirements of HIEs. To identify risks to HIE operations based on threats, assets, vulnerabilities, and probabilities of threat success.
Figure 3. Enabling Services
Entity Identity Assertion (Authentication)
HITSP Construct
To ensure that an entity is the person or application that claims the identity provided.
Credential Management Security Principles
To manage the life cycle of entity credentials used for authentication and access control.
Access Control (Authorization)
HITSP Construct
To ensure that an entity can access protected resources if they are permitted to do so.
Privilege Management Security Principles
To manage privileges (grant or deny) associated with entities for HIE transactions.
Collect and Communicate Audit Trail
HITSP Construct
To define and identify security relevant events and the data to be collected and communicated as determined by policy, regulation, or risk analysis.
Document Integrity HITSP Construct
To ensure the integrity of a document that is exchanged or shared.
Secured Communication Channel
HITSP Construct
To ensure the authenticity, the integrity, and the confidentiality of transactions, and the mutual trust between communicating parties.
Document Confidentiality Security Principles
To ensure the confidentiality of a document that is exchanged or shared.
De-identification Privacy Principles
To remove individual identifiers, so that it cannot be used to identify an individual.
Non-Repudiation HITSP Construct To ensure that information received can be confirmed as having been sent by the apparent sender, and that no reasonable basis exists for claiming that the information came from some other source; and to ensure that the sender can confirm that the intended recipient has received the information."
Service Name Source Definition
Manage Consent Directives
HITSP Construct
To ensure that individually identifiable health information is only accessed with an individual's consent.
Assumptions
Enabling services identified in this section focus on the "exchange" aspect of HIE operations. To truly create a secure HIE environment, additional services are required to protect the data of the participating entities' organization infrastructure (end points). Services such as contingency planning and configuration management that are used to secure a participating entity's infrastructure are not covered in this document, which focuses on the exchange of health information only. Internal services, such as Contingency Planning and Configuration Management, which are used to secure an entity's internal infrastructure, are not covered. Also, many of the managerial and operational security controls that are not directly part of a cross enterprise exchange are also not addressed but these measures may be critical for a complete security program for an organization. Organizations must ensure that these controls implemented in their HIEs are integrated and mutually supportive of the technology architecture derived from the design process outlined in this publication.
Enabling Services
The twelve enabling services identified below are derived from the HITSP Security, Privacy, and Infrastructure construct definitions, and common established security principles. Information is provided, where available, to consolidate work previously conducted in this area in order to support a standardized, common vocabulary for HIE concepts.
In the following section, a definition and an illustrating example are provided for each service. Also provided is a list of other documents with further information regarding the specific enabling service. These referenced documents offer information for further insight and clarification.
Risk Assessment
Definition: To identify risks to HIE operations that may compromise PHI information resulting in unauthorized disclosure, loss of integrity, or lack of availability.
Illustration: A county government decides to build a health information exchange network to research heart disease. HIE-participating entities perform a comprehensive risk assessment by examining the information to be exchanged over the network. They decide to categorize the information into three assurance levels (low, medium, high) based on the sensitivity of the information. The community then decides what measures are required for each assurance level. Specific threats are evaluated for their potential to exploit existing vulnerabilities and documented as threats. Existing measures are evaluated for their ability to mitigate these threats and additional measures are decided upon to ensure residual risks are acceptable. The complete set of security controls is documented and used in a trust agreement enforced by the HIE. 
Entity Identity Assertion (Authentication)
Definition: To ensure that an entity is the person or application that claims the identity provided.
Illustration: A Doctor at Hospital One wishes to access Joan Taylor's records for the purposes of entering new data concerning her health status. This new data may later be accessed by other healthcare providers that are members of the HIE. The Doctor uses an approved computer terminal to access the Hospital's HIE system. Before accessing the patient's record, the Doctor is asked to provide his username and a password that he has chosen and that is known only to him, but that is recognized by the HIE information system. The enabling service then receives the input of the Doctor's asserted user name and identity, and compares that assertion with preexisting records to authenticate the Doctor. 
Credential Management
Definition: To manage the life cycle of entity credentials used for authentication and access control.
Illustration: Hospital One has three assurance levels for the information exchanged on its network. For information of each assurance level, accepting authentication credentials and the life cycle of those credentials are defined. The credential life cycle includes an identity proofing process to obtain, validate, renew, and revoke the credential. 
Access Control (Authorization)
Definition: To ensure that an entity can access protected resources if they are permitted to do so.
Illustration: A Doctor joins the staff at Hospital and needs to have access to the information system supporting Hospital's participation in the HIE. The attending physician, having confirmed that such access would be appropriate, contacts the Hospital's HIE system administrator and requests that the Doctor receive access to the system. The system administrator creates an account for the Doctor and sets his permissions such that the Doctor is able to access PHI for all patients and services that he may need to access in order to perform his job. This process ensures that the Doctor is in the restricted group of individuals who, under the policies of the institution, may receive access to PHI, including PHI accessed at other healthcare providers within the HIE. The enabling service reflects that the Doctor has received permission to access these systems based on the organization's authorization policy and validates the permission every time an access request is made.
Other References: HITSP TP 20 "Access Control"
CCHIT Requirement description: Security: Item numbers 9003 and 9004, "Access Controls," category descriptions relevant to management of security authorizations.
HIPAA Security/Privacy Rule references: 164.308(a)(4), Implementation Specification: Access Authorization, Implementation Specification: Access Establishment and Modification.
NIST 800-53 security control family: Access Controls (AC)
Privilege Management
Definition: To manage privileges (grant or deny) associated with entities for HIE transactions.
Illustration: Doctor from Hospital One participates in a research HIE. He has access to certain research projects within the network. The research HIE administrator provisions Doctor and grants him access privileges only to research projects in which he participates. When any research project is finished, the HIE administrator will remove Doctor's access privilege accordingly.
Other References: CCHIT Requirement description: See Item numbers 10012-10023, 10031, "Authentication," 9081-9083 and 9144-9146, "Entity Identity Assertion," although CCHIT does not make a strong distinction between "Privilege management" and "Authorization."
HIPAA Security Rule references: 164.308(a)(4), Standard: Information Access Management.
NIST 800-53 security control family: AC-13, Supervision and Review-Account Management.
Collecting and Communicating Audit Trails
Definition: To define and identify security relevant events and the data to be collected and communicated as determined by policy, regulation, or risk analysis to support identification of those security relevant events.
Illustration:
The System Administrator reviews a file that is generated by the HIE-enabling system on a daily basis. The Audit Trail enabling service generates a record of the users who have accessed what files and when. The enabling service also makes note of any attempts to access the system from an unauthorized terminal; the use of an expired username or password; unusual numbers of password attempts; and other potential attempted violations of security policies. The System Administrator may take appropriate action to ensure that future attempts at gaining unauthorized access are unsuccessful. 
Ensuring Document Integrity
Definition: To ensure the integrity of a document that is exchanged or shared.
Illustration: Hospital One sends a record to Hospital Two using a one-way hash to confirm that the record has not been altered in transit. 
Preserving Document Confidentiality
Definition: To ensure that personal health information is not sent intentionally or unintentionally to a party that is not authorized to view it, either by the patient or by a provider that has received the patient's authorization or a waiver of the patient's authorization.
Illustration: Hospital One intends to send records containing PHI to Hospital Two. In selecting recipients, Hospital One is asked to provide the name of the receiving physician in an appropriate entry field, but the sender cannot type in any e-mail address, or create a new account for an unauthorized recipient. The enabling service that limits the choice of recipient helps to ensure that only those with access to the HIE are able to receive patient's PHI. 
De-Identification
Definition: To ensure that individuals' records have all data elements removed before the data is shared for statistical, research, public health, or other reasons that do not benefit the data subject directly, and for which no authorization has been provided, such that there is no reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to identify an individual.
Illustration: A Researcher at a Hospital wants to study the records of all patients with a particular form of cancer within a certain age range. He contacts his organization's research review board to confirm that his protocol will be conducted ethically and within all state, federal, and local laws and guidelines. He then contacts all providers in the HIE network and asks them to help him populate a database of de-identified information. Providers contact all patients fitting the profile and secure their consent. Each provider then uses the De-Identification enabling service to remove all potentially identifying information from each consenting patient's record, and then sends the record to a database. Because ages are a relevant research parameter, birth years are retained in each record, although exact birth dates are removed.
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Other References: CCHIT Requirement description: Item number 9150, "Secondary uses of data" ("The system shall provide the means to suppress data elements upon request") and 7076-7078, "Secondary uses of clinical data."
HIPAA Security Rule and Privacy Rule references:
The requirements for de-identification under the HIPAA Privacy Rule are explicitly laid out in Section § 164.514, Other requirements relating to uses and disclosures of protected health information, subsections (a) (Standard: deidentification of protected health information), (b) (Implementation specifications: requirements for de-identification of protected health information), and (c) (Implementation specifications: reidentification).
NIST 800-53 security control family: None. This construct is highly specific to the healthcare environment and to healthcare information exchange in particular.
Non-Repudiation
Definition: To ensure that information received can be confirmed as having been sent by the apparent sender and that no reasonable basis exists for claiming that the information came from some other source; and to ensure that the sender can confirm that the intended recipient has received the information. NIST 800-53 security control family: Non-Repudiation (AU-10)
NIST Publications: SP 800-25, Federal Agency Use of Public Key Technology for Digital Signatures and Authentication
Managing Consent Directives
Definition: To ensure that individually identifiable health information is collected, accessed, used or disclosed only with a consumer's consent.
Illustration: A Hospital and a Specialist are both entities within the same HIE. The Hospital sends the Patient's PHI to the Specialist. The Specialist will review the PHI and provide a medical opinion, but will not interact with Patient directly. The Specialist's own in-house rules require that the Hospital confirms that the Patient has received an appropriate notice of privacy practices (NOPP) for data to be shared. The Managing Consent Directives service would enable the Specialist to confirm that Patient has received the NOPP.
Later, the Specialist wishes to de-identify the Patient's data and share it with a Researcher, also an HIE participant. Under HIPAA, patients must provide adequate consent before their data is sent to a repository for de-identification, so the Specialist asks the Hospital to contact the Patient to provide the necessary consent. The Patient does provide the consent, and when it is reflected via the enabling service, the Specialist de-identifies the record and submits it to the Researcher's repository. NIST 800-53 security control family: None. This construct is highly specific to the healthcare environment and to healthcare information exchange in particular.
Enabling Processes -Layer 3
The enabling processes define business processes for enabling services. While enabling services define the nomenclature of HIE data protection requirements, enabling processes expand the enabling services into detailed requirements based on an HIE's business practices. Enabling processes are HIE context-dependent (e.g., treatment, public health). Hence, HIEs of different contexts could implement the same enabling services with different enabling processes. The following paragraph is an example of enabling processes for an "Access Control" service:
Joan Taylor owns a protein database at a research institution. Her protein database is used in the Hope research project HIE with research scientists from a local university. Joan defines the following processes for the "Access Control" service:
• Only the Hope research project manager has read/write privileges to the database. However, the project manager can delegate read/write privileges to research project members.
• The database will be open for Hope research project use from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. everyday. Joan wants to reserve the other time slots for the research institution scientists.
• All accesses, internal and external, to the protein database need to be logged.
As illustrated in this example, enabling processes are written in plain English and are derived from an HIE participants' business practices. Enabling processes are detailed requirements for enabling services. They should be clearly defined and fully vetted within the HIE context for each enabling service.
Notional Architecture -Layer 4
Capstone policies (Layer 1), enabling services (Layer 2), and enabling processes (Layer 3) serve as the inputs to create the notional architecture which will be the blueprint to drive technical solution decisions. The notional architecture defines major architecture constructs and their relationships to implement enabling processes. It is standards-based, and technology-and vendorneutral. The notional architecture is dependent on the enabling processes and will vary between HIE implementations. The following components for building an HIE notional architecture are presented:
• Architecture design principles are guiding principles identified from information-sharing implementations in the industries that apply to HIE contexts; and
• Architecture constructs can serve as the basic building blocks for a notional architecture.
The notional architecture development process is illustrated in Figure 4 . 
Architecture Design Principles
Architecture design principles are best practices derived from large-scale information-sharing implementations. Design principles serve as the overall guidance for building security and privacy services for HIEs. This publication identifies five design principles:
• Conduct a risk assessment to determine appropriate assurance levels for shared information;
• Create a "master" trust agreement describing requirements for a trust domain (trust domain is defined in Section 8.1.2);
• Separate credential management and privilege management;
• Develop data protection capabilities as plug-and-play services; and
• Maintain a standards-based, technology-neutral, and vendor-neutral architecture.
These design principles are described in more detail in the following sections.
Conduct a Risk Assessment to Determine Appropriate Assurance Levels for Shared Information
Conducting a risk assessment on the information exchanged in any HIE is fundamental and critical to the effective protection of the information. Organizations should be aware of the security and privacy risks with the exchanged information in order to design a proper architecture.
The results of a risk assessment can enable HIE transactions to be categorized into assurance levels. Assurance levels define the degree of confidence required to conduct a specific HIE transaction. The assurance levels reflect the sensitivity and criticality of the information. The following table lists several examples of HIE transactions with associated assurance levels. Assurance levels are represented by a range (e.g., 1-2-3; high-medium-low, gold-silver-bronze) rather than absolute values due to their comparison nature. The representation of assurance levels helps an organization decide what kind of credential and what identity proofing process is needed for an HIE transaction (See Section 9.1.3 for details). The number of required assurance levels depends on the complexity of the information exchanged in HIEs.
Create a "Master" Trust Agreement Describing Security and Privacy Requirements for a Trust Domain
Once assurance levels are defined and risks are identified and mitigated, a trust domain can be created. A trust domain is a logical construct within which a single set of access control policies can be enforced for all HIE transactions. A master trust agreement can be created to enforce security requirements within a trust domain. The master trust agreement should be honored in every HIE transaction. For unique HIE transactions, specialized trust agreements might be created based on the master trust agreement. The organization that has a master trust agreement is able to provide every participating HIE entity a basic assurance, and avoid the complexity of requiring each participant in the HIE to execute a unique agreement with every other participant in the HIE.
Separate Credential Management and Privilege Management
Credential management governs the types of authentication credentials and their life cycle based on defined assurance levels. The following table lists examples of credentials of various assurance levels specific to credential management. Credential management grants a HIE entity its identity within the HIE context. The HIE identity usually has a global effect within a specific HIE. Once a HIE credential is granted to a HIE entity, it will be recognized across the HIE context until it is revoked or expired.
Privilege management governs privileges of an HIE entity (i.e., what an entity can do after authentication). Granting privileges requires a trusted credential on a HIE entity who requests access to certain information. The decision to grant privileges is usually made locally by the HIE entity which guards the requested information.
Due to the very different nature of credential and privilege management (global authentication vs. local authorization), these two topics should be separated when an organization is developing the notional architecture. The trust agreement should identify what kinds of credentials will be accepted for each assurance level in a HIE. HIE entities which guard requested information need to use an interoperable authorization language to express authorization policies. Authorization decisions will be made locally at HIE entities. HIE entities which guard the information should assume full authority on granting access privileges.
The trust agreement can be easily created when credential management and privilege management are separated. Having the global authentication credential and local authorization authority allows HIE entities to better control what information is exposed to HIEs and what information should be protected inside their own boundary.
Develop Data Protection Capabilities as Plug-and-Play Services
As described under "enabling services," the word "services" refers to the protections that a requester should be able to expect in each information exchange, regardless of whether the requester explicitly and knowingly makes such a request for these protections. Modeling data protection capabilities as services will have the following benefits:
• Loose coupling: scalable as requirements change;
• Plug-and-play: service users do not need to know the implementation details and interoperability is improved;
• Efficiency: instead of having every entity create its own services, the entities can use a common set of services; and
• Effectiveness: it is easier to enforce if every transaction goes through the same set of services.
Developing data protection capabilities as services also improves future interoperability with other HIEs.
Maintain a Standards-Based, Technology-Neutral, and Vendor-Neutral Architecture
Standards-based, technology-neutral and vendor-neutral characteristics are important for a notional architecture. These characteristics will aid in driving the selection of technical solutions and standards while maintaining forward compatibility as the solutions landscape evolves.
Architecture Constructs
Architecture constructs, usually originating from various industry standards, identify basic building blocks for a notional architecture. This section lists several important architecture constructs only as illustrative examples.
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
SAML, developed by the Security Services Technical Committee of the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS), is an Extensible Markup Language (XML)-based framework for communicating user authentication, entitlement, and attribute information. SAML allows business entities to make assertions regarding the identity, attributes, and entitlements of a subject (an entity that is often a human user) to other entities, such as a partner company or another enterprise application. SAML is a flexible and extensible protocol designed to be used -and customized if necessary -by other standards. The Liberty Alliance, the Internet2 Shibboleth project, and the OASIS Web Services Security (WS-Security) committee have all adopted SAML as a technological underpinning for various purposes.
For more information on SAML, visit www.oasis-open.org.
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
XACML was ratified as an OASIS standard in February 2003 (1.0 version). XACML defines a generic authorization architecture and the constructs for expressing and exchanging access control policy information using XML. Policy constructs include policies, rules, combining algorithms, etc. XACML complements SAML so that not only policy decisions, as well as the policies themselves, can be exchanged in a standard fashion.
For more information on XACML, visit www.oasis-open.org.
Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) Profiles
IHE is a global initiative that creates the framework for passing vital health information seamlessly -from application to application, system to system, and setting to setting -across multiple healthcare enterprises. IHE brings together healthcare information technology stakeholders to implement standards for communicating patient information efficiently throughout and among healthcare enterprises by developing a framework for interoperability.
For more information on IHE profiles, visit www.himss.org.
Web Services Security Standards
Web services security standards represent various specifications defined to implement Web services security. Figure 7 identifies Web services security standards. 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
With role-based access control, access decisions are based on the roles that individual users have as part of an organization. Users take on assigned roles (e.g., doctor, nurse, teller, manager). Access rights are grouped by role name, and the use of resources is restricted to individuals authorized to assume the associated role. For example, within a hospital system, the role of doctor can include operations to perform diagnosis, prescribe medication, and order laboratory tests, and the role of researcher can be limited to gathering anonymous clinical information for studies.
For more information on RBAC, visit csrc.nist.gov.
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)
An attribute-based access control model recognizes that a flexible access control policy should address the evaluation of multiple dimensions of an entity, including identifiers, roles, and qualifications. Since roles can be viewed as nothing more than attributes of principals, RBAC can be wholly absorbed into an attribute-based mechanism.
Attribute-based authorization policies have some distinct advantages over other approaches. First, an attribute-based approach recognizes from its inception that a flexible access control policy cannot be locked into evaluating only one dimension of a principle (such as an identity or role). For example, in order to provide proper controls for accessing sensitive information, it may be necessary to consider various other principal attributes such as doctor qualifications, formal access approvals, or organization affiliation. Second, an attribute-based approach takes into consideration that there are other attributes that are relevant to authorization policies besides those associated with resources or environmental attributes.
Technology Solutions and Standards -Layer 5
Once the notional architecture is complete, the last phase is to select the technical solutions and data standards that will satisfy the requirements specified in the architecture. Technical solutions and data standards represent the implementation of the notional architecture. Technical solutions and data standards to implement secure and private HIE services are determined based on the notional architecture. The following figure shows illustrative steps taking an organization from notional architecture to the implementation of secure HIE services.
Figure 6. Illustrative Steps from Notional Architecture to Secure HIE Services
While a notional architecture defines architecture constructs and their relationships, detailed design transforms a notional architecture into detailed implementation specifications that are ready for product selection, system development, or a hybrid of product selection and system development. Many HIE context and organization-specific considerations will need to be evaluated. For example, if most of the HIE participants utilize Java development resources, Javarelated technical solutions might be a better choice. Once technical solutions and data standards are selected, they go through deployment and testing cycles to assure that secure HIE services are provided.
Building a Nationwide HIE using Regional HIEs
As discussed in the previous section, this publication presents a five-layer development operating model for building security architectures for Regional HIEs. If Regional HIEs follow the fivelayer operating model, there will be many Regional HIEs using a standard set of data protection services. Although it is likely that each Regional HIE might implement the services differently based on its own HIE requirements, having a standard set of services allows for a common understanding of assurance levels that can allow for risk-based interconnection decisions. For example, while HIEs might have different access control policies and implementations, the existence of the common core access control service provides a foundation from which to further evaluate risk.
Using Regional HIEs as the building blocks, Multi-Regional HIEs can be built using a federated architecture as illustrated in the following figure. The federated architecture will centralize certain elements (e.g., trust agreements, assurance levels) while allowing the regional HIE to remain autonomous. 
Multi-Regional Federation
A nationwide HIE can be constructed in a similar way by connecting Multi-Regional HIEs using a federated architecture as illustrated in the following figure.
Figure 9. Nationwide HIE with Federated Data Protection Services
This publication provides a standardized systematic design methodology for developing a security architecture and technical solutions that support a core set of enabling services necessary for the secure exchange of health information. The overarching premise is that if entities engaged in the exchange of health information utilize a standard approach for the selection of security architectures, the probability and the ease of scalability would be dramatically increased.
layer of the operating model. Only one enabling service is further defined in subsequent layers in this document.
A.1 Illustrative Clinical Assessment Scenario
Carol has, in the past, used a Web-based Personalized Health Record (PHR) system to store her personal medical history, including health conditions of her parents and her genetically-related relatives. Carol then begins seeing Dr. Alice. Before seeing Dr. Alice, Carol grants her access to some, but not all, of her PHR.
Dr. Alice retrieves Carol's PHR from the Web-based system based on Carol's authorization. To make a sound clinical assessment, Dr. Alice asks for Carol's permission to request additional information from her previous family doctor, Dr. Bob. She also asks Carol for more information on the health conditions and health history of her parents, and for "read-write-delete" level permissions in order to make appropriate entries or corrections to Carol's PHR. Having received Carol's authorization, Dr. Alice obtains the information and constructs a consolidated view of Carol's personal and family health history. While reviewing Carol's health records, Dr. Alice finds several duplications and eliminates them from the record.
Dr. Alice uses the consolidated information to conduct a clinical assessment, develop a diagnostic plan, and update Carol's PHR. Carol receives an updated PHR with Dr. Alice's inputs. Figure 11 is a graphical representation of the illustrative clinical assessment scenario.
A.2 Identifying the Health Information Exchanges
Figure 11. Illustrative Clinical Assessment Scenario
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In the illustrative scenario, there are six health information exchanges:
1. Carol stores personal medical history and family health information into a Web-based Personal Health Record (PHR) system; 2. Carol grants access permissions to Dr. Alice; 3. Dr. Alice retrieves Carol's personal medical history and family health information from the Web-based PHR; 4. Dr. Alice retrieves Carol's personal medical information from her previous doctor, Dr.
Bob; 5. Dr. Alice updates Carol's personal medical history; and 6. Carol receives updated PHR from the Web-based system.
The HIE security architecture design methodology will be applied to scenario to demonstrate a secure exchange of health information.
A.3 Identify Capstone Policies -Layer 1
Capstone policies include the national regulations, state and local regulations, and organizational policies that apply to the exchange of health information in this illustrative example.
A.3.1 National Regulations
The most significant data protection requirements governing the exchange described are the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules. Other federal laws and regulations may govern other kinds of healthcare transactions, particularly those that involve exchanges of information with particular government agencies; healthcare research activities; exchanges of particularly sensitive healthcare information, such as information about substance abuse treatment; or sharing information for purposes other than healthcare treatment, payment, or operations (such as law enforcement, public health reporting, or marketing). Given this scenario, however, HIPAA is certainly the most significant capstone policy driver.
A.3.2 State and Local Regulations
Depending on the state and jurisdiction, other rules may govern the use, disclosure, or security of protected health information (PHI). For example, a majority of states require entities conducting business in the state to provide notice to all affected individuals in the event of a breach or loss of private data, including PHI.
In cases where state law conflicts with HIPAA, HIPAA explicitly allows state law to take precedence over HIPAA if the state law is "more stringent." That is, the state law supplies even greater protections to an individual's privacy, or requires additional or stronger security protections than those required by HIPAA.
In the current case, it is assumed that relevant state law:
• Requires the disclosure of PHI to any healthcare provider at the patient's written request.
HIPAA merely allows covered entities to share this information with other healthcare providers for payment, treatment, or operations purposes. As disclosure is compelled under this hypothetical state law, it is "more stringent" and must be followed.
• Forbids the disclosure of PHI to a patient's otherwise authorized representative if, in the judgment of the healthcare provider, releasing that information could cause the patient harm. Many states have a provision such as this one such that healthcare providers would not, for example, be obliged to disclose information about mental or physical abuse to the patient's A-3 possible abuser. As this measure allows the patient even more protection than HIPAA explicitly allows, it is "more stringent" and should be followed.
• Requires the provider to disclose to the patient or a patient's representative or guardian if there is a known or suspected breach of the patient's unencrypted information. As this notification is not explicitly required by HIPAA, it is "more stringent" and must be followed.
A.3.3 Organizational Policies
Further requirements may be imposed by the institutions at which Dr. Alice and Dr. Bob practice. While HIPAA sets parameters for data protections, its standards often require the institution to implement their own reasonable policies in certain areas. Other individual institutional rules may be driven by other laws, such as the Common Rule for Human Subjects Research; institutional accreditation standards; contractual obligations with business partners; or best practices.
This scenario assumes that certain appropriate rules apply to the Web-based PHR system used by Carol. Rules will be proposed only to the extent necessary to address one enabling service, Entity Identity Assertion. These rules are not intended to be complete, and no assertion is made as to their adequacy for any real-world entity or environment.
This scenario assumes that the following institutional (corporate) rules apply for Carol's access to her PHR:
• Carol, and anyone to whom she grants access to her account, must log in using a username and ID.
• Passwords must have a minimum "strength," as described below.
• Carol, and anyone to whom she grants access to her account, must use a digital certificate to access her account • Carol, and anyone to whom she grants access to her account, must use a hardware token to assert their identity.
•
Carol has unrestricted access to her own PHR.
Carol has unlimited privileges to grant access and privileges to others, including privileges to read, write, edit, or delete her account.
In addition, other institutional-level restrictions may apply to Dr. Alice's and Dr. Bob's institutions. Dr. Alice and Dr. Bob may have to log on to their accounts using separate identity assertion controls.
A.4 Identify Enabling Services -Layer 2
The Security and Privacy Operating Model identified the 12 enabling services that every HIE should consider. Based on the six identified HIEs, the following table lists enabling services that should be used in each HIE: Risk assessment is used to analyze the business risks of compromising the security and privacy of the health information exchanged.
Entity Identity Assertion
The Web-based PHR requires Carol to identify herself using a registered credential every time she logs in. 
Credential Management
The Web-based PHR that Carol selects will require Carol to use certain types of credentials to register.
Privilege Management
Carol has full access permissions to her PHR and she can assign access permissions to her doctors.
Audit Trail
All accesses to Carol's Web-based PHR will be logged. Suspicious accesses will trigger warning messages that will be sent to Carol. Secure Communication Channel
All information transmitted is secured between Carol's terminal and the Webbased PHR.
Entity Identity Assertion
The Web-based PHR requires Carol to identify herself using registered credentials every time she logs in.
Access Control
The Web-based PHR allows Carol to change access permissions associated with her PHR.
Privilege Management
Carol assigns access permissions on certain portions of her personal medical history to Dr. Alice.
Audit Trail
The Web-based PHR maintains a record of Carol's action of assigning access permissions to Dr. Alice. The identified enabling services supporting the health information exchanges need to be in place to enable the information exchanges among Dr. Alice, Carol, Dr. Bob and the Web-based PHR system. Implementation of one enabling service, Entity Identity Assertion, is addressed in the following sections.
A.5 Develop Enabling Processes -Layer 3
The Entity Identity Assertion service of the Web-based PHR system has the following requirements based on the HIE activities indicated in the illustrative scenario above.
• The system shall accept three types of credentials to authenticate users (including service providers, consumers, and any others): o User created ID with Strong password; o Digital certificates; and o Hardware tokens.
• The system shall authenticate every transaction.
• The system shall accept credentials (any of the three types) issued from trusted third parties.
A.5.1 Authentication Credentials
The system has defined the following processes on how three types of credentials can be accepted: Table 6 . Processes for Credential Acceptance
Credentials Processes
User ID and Password • Passwords must be stored in irreversible encrypted form and the password file cannot be viewed in unencrypted form.
• A password must not be displayed on the data entry/display device.
•
Passwords must be at least eight characters long.
• Passwords must be composed of at least three of the following: English uppercase letters, English lowercase letters, numeric characters, and special characters.
• Password lifetime will not exceed 60 days.
• Users cannot use the previous six passwords.
The system will give the user a choice of alternative passwords from which to chose. • Passwords must be changed by the user after initial logon. Digital Certificates • The certificate must be an X.509v3 certificate.
The certificate must be within the valid period.
The certificate must be verified and validated through authentication.
The system will not issue digital certificates. Users will present trusted third party issued certificates that are valid and verifiable by the system. Hardware Tokens
• The system will accept and support pre-approved types of hardware tokens as authentication credentials.
A.5.2 Accepting Trusted Third-Party-Issued Credentials
The system defines its processes and policies of accepting third-party authentication credentials as follows: Table 7 . Acceptance of Third-Party Authentication Credentials
Credentials Processes
User ID and Password • A trusted third party must comply with the system's User ID and Password rules (e.g., minimum password strength requirements must be met).
•
The system shall accept authentication claims from a third party authentication authority.
The third party authentication claim shall comply with the system's profile for authentication claims. Digital Certificates • Since the system will not issue digital certificates, all certificates will be issued by trusted third parties.
The system shall only accept digital certificates that issued by authorities comply with the system's X.509 profile.
• The system's X.509 profiles defines requirements to be a trusted certificate authority and the certificate validation process. Hardware Tokens
• User can only request hardware tokens from the system. No third party hardware tokens will be accepted.
As illustrated above, the enabling processes further refine the Entity Identity Assertion service for the Web-based PHR system. The enabling processes will vary for different HIEs. These processes will translate into part of the governance policies which could be part of the trust agreement between HIE entities.
A.6 Develop Notional Architecture -Layer 4
Based on the defined enabling processes, a notional architecture can be developed for the Entity Identity Assertion service. This notional architecture is a standards-based, platform-independent and vendor-neutral implementation blueprint for enabling services and processes, and it will drive the selection of technical solutions. Figure 13 provides an illustrative example of the notional architecture for the Web-based PHR system's Entity Identity Assertion Service.
A-7 Il lu s tr a ti v e
In the notional architecture, four different scenarios are described:
• Self-Registered UserID and Password (User A): Users register themselves with the Webbased PHR system by creating a User ID and password. Users must go through the identity proofing process defined by Web-based PHR system. • Third-Party UserID and Password (User B): Users are redirected to their home organizations to perform the authentication. The home organization's (Organization B) authentication authority (e.g., LDAP) will issue a SAML assertion to the Web-based PHR system as the authentication credential.
• Hardware Token (User C): Users who request hardware tokens from Web-based PHR system can use the issued token as the authentication credential.
• Third-Party Certificates (User D): Users use third-party issued certificates as authentication credentials.
The Identity Federation Service (IFS) will serve as the authentication portal which accepts all types of credentials and creates a trusted identity for authenticated users into the Web-based PHR System. The trusted identity could be a digital certificate or a SAML assertion.
A.7 Select Technical Solutions -Layer 5
Once the notional architecture is determined, technical solutions can be selected and deployed to implement the architecture. An illustrative example of the deployment of possible technical solutions is depicted in Figure 14 .
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Figure 13. Illustrative Technical Solutions for Entity Identity Assertion Service
A.8 Considerations for Health Information Exchange
Following a similar process as illustrated above, an organization can implement all enabling services necessary to facilitate the secure and private exchange of health information in this scenario. The services described in this architecture design methodology focus only on the exchange portion; they do not focus on those services necessary to implement security and privacy within the involved organizations. To provide end-to-end protection of health information, the involved organizations need to implement relevant services that provide adequate protection for the information outside the bounds of exchange.
The actual data exchange --that is, the act of transmitting and receiving the health information--is a point of particular vulnerability to the security and privacy of consumer information in the health information exchange, because it is usually done outside of the participating organizations' security boundaries. However, to ensure that a consumer's information is adequately protected, the "non-exchange" portions of the data usage, including collection, storage, modification, and destruction, must also receive security and privacy protections, which may include disaster recovery and contingency planning, configuration management, and other processes and technologies.
A-9
